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domestic demand differs across countries, so too does the optimal degree of monetary tightening and exchange 
rate adjustment. This observation makes clear that an attempt to suppress intra-Asian exchange rate movements 
would be counterproductive in this context. Other policy measures that produce effects over longer horizons that 
can further contribute to the rotation of demand away from exports to the US include the development of Asian 
ﬁnancial markets and the completion of an Asian free trade area. These policy adjustments will occur most easily 
if they are coordinated within Asia.
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Global Imbalances and the Asian Economies:
Implications for Regional Cooperation
I.   Introduction
Global imbalances and the trans-Paciﬁc imbalance between the United States (US) and Asia in particular loom 
over all discussions of the need for international policy coordination. The paradox is that the inﬂuence of these 
imbalances has been benign to date. And, in turn, the fact that the inﬂuence of the trans-Paciﬁc imbalance 
has been benign has limited the perceived urgency of policy responses designed to ensure a smooth global 
adjustment. The US, by running a large and persistent current account deﬁcit, has helped sustain the growth 
of global demand. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), by running a large and growing current account 
surplus, has helped sustain the growth of global supply. By providing a buoyant market for the exports of other 
countries, the US has facilitated the pursuit of export-led growth. It has enabled emerging markets in East Asia 
and elsewhere to accumulate unprecedented stocks of international reserves. By providing an elastic supply of 
consumer goods, the PRC, for its part, has moderated global inﬂationary pressures and allowed the US Federal 
Reserve System (Fed) and other central banks to maintain a relatively accommodating monetary stance. To be 
sure, these insights are not new: the idea that global imbalances have beneﬁts not just for the US, but also for 
the surplus countries is at the heart of the “global co-dependence” and “New Bretton Woods” views of the current 
global conjuncture (Mann, 2004, and Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2003). 
Of course, all this could change at a stroke. If questions arise about the sustainability of the US current account 
deﬁcit and the willingness of America to take steps needed to readjust its position, foreign ﬁnance for the US 
deﬁcit could dry up abruptly. If the US capital account moves toward balance, the US current account will have 
to move toward balance as well. The curtailment of ﬁnancial inﬂows will mean a reduced demand for US dollar 
(dollar) assets. As Treasury bond prices fall, US interest rates will rise. As the demand for dollar-denominated 
assets is curtailed, the dollar exchange rate will depreciate, and higher import prices will fan imported inﬂation 
and, perhaps ultimately, force the Fed to raise policy rates further than currently anticipated. 
None of this bodes particularly well for continued economic expansion in the US. To be sure, the more quickly 
a weaker dollar boosts American exports, the more moderate will be any US slowdown. But even this scenario, 
while relatively favorable for the US, will still not be good news for the rest of the world, as it implies a signiﬁcant 
shift in demand away from the products of other countries.
This paper poses the question of how policy, in Asia in particular, should be adapted in light of these risks. More 
precisely, it distinguishes two questions: 
•  What policy adjustments should be implemented now, while the trans-Paciﬁc imbalance persists? Are 
there constructive policy adjustments that would minimize the danger of a disorderly correction of the 
current position and help facilitate the adjustment of current accounts to sustainable levels?  
•  If a disorderly adjustment nonetheless takes place, what policies should governments and central banks 
then implement to minimize damaging consequences? In particular, how should Asian countries respond 
to a sharp fall in the level of the dollar, if and when it occurs?
In each context I consider the case for international policy coordination across the Paciﬁc and within Asia. I ask 
whether coordinated responses are likely to be more efﬁcient than responses taken individually at the national 
level, both ex ante and ex post. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a capsule description of the current 
situation. Section 3 considers the risk of a disorderly correction, while Section 4 scrutinizes the channels through 
which Asian economies may be affected. Sections 5–7 consider possible policy responses at the national, 
regional, and global levels, respectively. Section 8 summarizes the discussion. 2
While there is no single deﬁnitive interpretation of the trans-Paciﬁc imbalance, a number of inﬂuential accounts 
raise doubts about the risk of a disorderly correction. But the absence of a consensus is not a justiﬁcation for 
inaction on the part of policy makers. Similarly, there may be no consensus about the likelihood of another 
Asian tsunami, but this does not relieve policy makers of the need to prepare—and to buy insurance against the 
possibility. There is an analogous argument for preparing for the possibility of a disorderly correction of the US 
current account. 
Doing so requires clearly identifying how Asian economies will feel the effects of a disorderly correction and 
moving from there to identifying the optimal policy response. The argument of this paper is that, in contrast to 
earlier periods characterized by rising US interest rates and sudden stops in capital ﬂows to emerging markets, 
this time it is unlikely to be ﬁnancial channels through which emerging Asian countries are primarily affected. 
Emerging markets are running current account surpluses instead of deﬁcits and minimizing borrowing. Stronger 
policies have reduced the danger of capital ﬂight. Prudent debt management has prompted governments to pre-
fund their external ﬁnancing needs. This is not to suggest that the exceptionally low level of emerging market 
spreads will persist indeﬁnitely. But ample international reserves will help countries compensate for any ﬂight 
to quality and adverse shifts in the price and direction of international capital ﬂows, if and when an adjustment 
occurs.
Rather, the principal risk to the emerging Asian economies lies in the possibility that a disorderly correction could 
precipitate a major slowdown in US growth and, in particular, the growth of US net import demand. Exposure to 
the danger of a disorderly correction is thus greatest for countries that are highly open and export heavily to the 
US.
How should Asian policy makers respond to these risks? I argue in this paper that the appropriate policy package 
has six components:
(i)  Asian currencies should be allowed to begin appreciating against the dollar now in order to narrow current 
account surpluses with the US—thereby reducing the region’s exposure to a sudden compression in the 
US deﬁcit. Movement toward greater exchange rate ﬂexibility now, before re-balancing pressures mount 
further, would minimize conﬁdence problems and give authorities greater monetary ﬂexibility, which is 
precisely what the need.1  
(ii)  Regional trade liberalization initiatives can help in this context. They will limit the need to radically 
restructure  production  away  from  exports  and  allow  Asian  economies  to  continue  exploiting  their 
comparative advantage.
(iii) But  because  trade  liberalization  initiatives  will  not  affect  the  overall  level  of  demand,  offsetting  the 
contractionary  impact  on  demand  of  currency-appreciation-cum-monetary-tightening  will  require  in 
addition domestic policies of ﬁscal stimulus. Fiscal loosening should be carefully considered on a case-
by-case basis, of course, in the context of well-deﬁned expenditure programs that address priority areas, 
sound  public  expenditure  management  practices,  and  appropriate  recognition  of  contingent  liability 
and debt sustainability issues. But, that said, maintaining an appropriate level of demand in the face of 
currency appreciation and monetary tightening will require some expansionary thrust from ﬁscal policy.   
(iv) Measures promoting ﬁnancial market development can also help by relaxing credit constraints and 
reducing the incentive for high levels of precautionary savings. But these work over a longer horizon 
1  A strategy of tightening monetary policy in a series of steps, in anticipation of gradual, progressive appreciation of the currency, 
runs the risk that investors will anticipate what is coming, buy the currency aggressively, and cause an excessive appreciation. 
This is less of a problem for countries like the PRC with restrictions on capital account transactions than it is for other, more open, 
Asian countries. The other countries still have some scope for managing their currencies so as to smooth their movement in this 
transition, notably by engaging in sterilized and unsterilized intervention. Thus, the recommendation that currencies be allowed to 
appreciate against the dollar should not be confused with calls, made elsewhere, for ﬂoating exchange rates free of all central bank 
management.3
2 This present perspective on ﬁnancial development and integration is also quite different from the conventional Asian emphasis on the 
desirability of deepening regional ﬁnancial markets in order to better “recycle Asian savings within the region.” The perspective here 
does not suggest that attempting diverting high Asian savings from the U.S. to the region itself will, by itself, have an impact on global 
imbalances or the risk of a disorderly correction.  For more on this, see below.
3 In addition, there is a global coordination scenario, also discussed below, in which this shift in the monetary-ﬁscal mix in Asia was 
complemented by a mirror-image shift in the policy mix in the US – speciﬁcally, by steps to narrow the U.S. budget deﬁcit, which in turn 
would permit the Federal Reserve to complete the process of raising its discount rate sooner rather than later.  In practice, signiﬁcant 
obstacles stand in the way of a trans-Paciﬁc agreement. Realism requires acknowledging that global coordination is unlikely to be in 
the cards.
4  That said, Asia is America’s single most important regional counterparty.
5  Although restatements of the denominator with the release of revised data on PRC GDP toward the end of 2005 work to put downward 
pressure on the ratio.
and are thus less helpful for offsetting a disorderly correction of the trans-Paciﬁc imbalance that occurs 
relatively soon. Indeed, focusing on such long-term measures alone may increase the risk of disruptive 
effects when the adjustment occurs.2
(v) Since the scope for complementary policies differs across countries, so too does the scope for currency 
appreciation. The argument that Asian currencies will have to appreciate as a group against the dollar 
is not an argument for suppressing intraregional currency movements. Attempting to lock diverse Asian 
countries into a single exchange rate straitjacket is a recipe for suppressing adjustment.
(vi) That said, adjustments can be undertaken more easily and will be more effective if they are coordinated 
across countries. Within Asia this means reaching agreement on the desirability of stronger currencies 
against the dollar and of ﬁscal stimulus. It means redoubling efforts to complete an Asian free trade area 
and cooperating on ﬁnancial development. It means negotiating an agreement on reserve transparency 
to facilitate the orderly diversiﬁcation of foreign reserves and minimize the risk of destabilizing portfolio 
shifts. It means building stronger and more independent regional surveillance institutions to facilitate 
collective assessment of economic conditions, risks, and vulnerabilities. All of these steps are considered 
below.3
II.   The Current Position and its Interpretation
The basic facts about the trans-Paciﬁc imbalance are well known even if their interpretation is contentious. The 
US current account deﬁcit reached some 6.5% of GDP in 2005 and has continued expanding. The US is now a 
net foreign debtor to the tune of nearly 25% of US GDP, or 7.5% of world GDP. US deﬁcits have their counterpart 
surpluses in virtually all other regions, with the exceptions of only Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The largest 
surpluses in absolute terms are those of Japan, emerging Asia, the oil producers of the Middle East and North 
Africa, and the euro area, in descending order of importance. While ﬁnal ﬁgures for 2005 are not yet in, every 
indication is that these imbalances will have widened to at least 6.5% of US GDP. The strength of the dollar has 
continued to encourage US imports and to restrain the growth of its exports. Slow growth in Europe and Japan 
has limited the expansion of these regions’ consumption and investment demand.
Where the US current account deﬁcit is approaching 2% of global GDP, Asia’s current account surplus is “only” 
on the order of 1% of global GDP (3% of Asian GDP). Thus, Asia is the counterparty for only a fraction of the US 
external deﬁcit.4 The expansion of Asia’s current account surplus in recent years has been driven mainly by the 
behavior of the PRC and Japan (with surpluses of 4.25% and 3.75% of GDP, respectively). Forecasts suggest 
that the PRC current account surplus will have widened further in 2005, to perhaps 5.5–6.0% of the country’s 
GDP.5 The current account balances of Japan and emerging Asia ex PRC will probably have declined marginally 
in 2005, reﬂecting high oil-import bills. 
Note that the rise in Asia’s foreign exchange reserves has exceeded its current account surplus, reﬂecting 
capital inﬂows. Those inﬂows slowed in 2005 due to the strengthening of the dollar and renewed ﬂows toward 4
the US. International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates show Asia’s capital account surplus as falling by two-thirds 
between the second half of 2004 and the ﬁrst half of 2005.6  Asian central banks, again led by but not limited to 
those of the PRC and Japan, have accumulated a large volume of foreign exchange reserves. In total, regional 
reserves more than doubled between the end-2001 and end-2005. 
These patterns are open to different interpretations.7 Given that a country’s current account balance is necessarily 
the difference between its savings (S) and investment (I), and given the further fact that the US deﬁcit (S–I) 
equals the surplus of the rest of the world (I*–S*)—that is to say, that global savings and global investment are 
necessarily equal to one another—the simplest way of distinguishing explanations for global imbalances is to 
separate them into four categories, emphasizing S, S*, I and I*, respectively.
A ﬁrst set of views focuses on events in the US. This emphasis derives from the observation that no other single 
country or region has a current account surplus as a share of global GDP that begins to approach that of the US. 
As already noted, the US deﬁcit is closing in on 2% of global GDP. Emerging Asia’s surplus, in contrast, is still 
“a mere” 0.5% of global GDP. Japan’s surplus is on the order of 0.4% of global GDP. The oil exporting countries, 
for their part, account for a further 0.5% of global GDP, while the euro area and miscellaneous emerging markets 
account for the remainder. None of this is to argue that policy outside the US is irrelevant. But from this point 




A ﬁrst interpretation thus focuses on the decline in national saving in the US. This view observes that a negative 
shock to national savings will result, other things equal, in a matching deterioration in the current account. US 
gross national saving has fallen to 13.6% of GDP on the IMF’s measure, down by 3.3 percentage points from 
the 1983–2000 average and barely half the level prevailing in the rest of the world.8  Household saving as 
conventionally measured has fallen essentially to zero. Public saving, meanwhile, has swung from a positive 
2.5% of GDP in 2001 to a negative 3.5% of GDP today. Only a relatively high level of corporate saving has kept 
overall US savings rates in positive territory.9
US personal saving rates peaked in the early 1980s at 11% of GDP and have been trending downward since. 
No doubt one important factor has been high level of asset prices (equity prices before 2000, housing prices 
thereafter). If this rise in asset prices is permanent, reﬂecting the fundamental strengths of the US economy, 
then there is less reason to worry about the behavior of household saving. Households seeing themselves with 
permanently higher levels of wealth can afford to draw down their assets toward target levels by increasing 
current consumption on the basis of, say, home equity loans. As wealth is restored to target levels, household 
savings will begin to rise toward positive territory again, and the current account deﬁcit will move relatively 
smoothly toward more obviously sustainable levels.
But an alternative interpretation of the high level of asset prices is that these reﬂect not the strong underlying 
state of the US economy but low real interest rates resulting from monetary policy, a situation that is unlikely to 
persist. By this interpretation the high level of asset prices reﬂects the loose monetary policy implemented by 
the Fed in the early parts of the decade in response to fears of deﬂation. This has reduced the cost of borrowing 
to ﬁnance purchases of real estate, to undertake home construction, and to speculate in ﬁnancial markets. The 
resulting demand for assets has fueled the boom in real estate prices that has increased households’ perceived 
wealth. 
6  See IMF (2005a). For further discussion of the sources of dollar strength see below.
7  The remainder of this section is an elaboration of the analysis in Eichengreen (2005a).
8  See Roach (2005), p.2.
9  Note, however, that the fact that US savings have fallen by bit little more than 3 percentage points cannot account by itself for the 
widening of the US current account deﬁcit, which has moved from slightly more 2% of US GDP in the 1983–2000 period to nearly 7% of 
US GDP today. By this metric, declining US savings account for half of the increase, while rising US investment accounts for the other 
half. I consider the behavior of investment below.5
10 The explanation for this disconnect was, of course, the Internet bubble of 1995–1999, which both strengthened the budget by stimulating 
capital-gains-related revenues and encouraged investment in information and communications technology. This points us to the “new 
economy” view of US current account deﬁcits to be discussed momentarily.
11 As just noted.
12 Using panel data for a group of industrial countries, Chinn and Ito (2005) obtain almost an identical estimate.  In contrast, Gruber and 
Kamin (2005) obtain a smaller and less signiﬁcant coefﬁcient.
13 A phenomenon known as “the Greenspan conundrum.”
But now that this monetary stimulus is being withdrawn and policy rates are returning to more conventional 
levels, asset prices—real estate prices in particular—could take a tumble. The implication, as before, is that 
US households, seeing their wealth decline, will boost their savings. But in this scenario it is harder to imagine 
a smooth adjustment. Housing prices have been known to adjust downward abruptly. Were this to happen, US 
households might be led to curtail their spending equally abruptly. If lower prices lead households to walk away 
from their mortgage obligations, there also could be problems for ﬁnancial institutions holding mortgage loans 
and for banks and funds holding mortgage-backed securities.
Other observers focus on ﬁscal rather than monetary policy and on public rather than private savings. Roubini 
and Setser (2004) blame the decline in US savings rates on American budgetary policy. They observe that a 
decline in public saving like that which occurred in the US since 2001 will lead to a matching decline in national 
saving and a matching deterioration in the country’s current account balance, other things equal. They observe 
the coincidence of the decline in gross saving and the rise in the US current account deﬁcit, the implication being 
that the “other-things-equal” assumption is not a bad approximation to reality. They observe that the magnitudes 
are right: that the 6%-of-GDP swing in the ﬁscal balance more or less matches the swing in the US current 
account.
Critics object that over the longer run there is only weak evidence of strong positive co-movements in the budget 
and current account balances. Thus Bernanke (2005) points to the second half of the 1990s when the US current 
account deteriorated by $300 billion despite the fact that the ﬁscal position was improving.10
Others more sympathetic to the twin-deﬁcits view (e.g. Truman 2004) respond that the current account balance 
is also affected by other shocks.11 While a decline in public saving will tend to increase foreign saving, other 
things equal, the two variables need not move in lockstep; their bivariate relationship will also be affected by 
third variables. More troubling is the fact that econometric studies of the impact of budget deﬁcits on current 
account deﬁcits still ﬁnd only a weak correlation between these variables even after controlling for other factors. 
Thus, Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005) ﬁnd that a $1 billion decline in the US budget deﬁcit produces only a 
$200 million improvement in the current account.12  
The channel responsible for the offset is presumably the reduction in private saving that accompanies the increase 
in public saving—in other words, Ricardian equivalence. In the present context the mechanism would be that 
lower deﬁcits mean lower interest rates, which encourage household borrowing. This appears to be what lies 
behind US Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke’s view that tightening ﬁscal policy might reduce the current account 
deﬁcit only at the cost of further inﬂating the housing bubble. At the same time, the evidence for Ricardian 
equivalence is weak. It implies that personal savings rates should have risen since 2001 in response to the fall 
in public saving, where the opposite was the case. And it strains credulity that US household saving would have 
been even lower in this counterfactual where public saving was higher.     
The most telling objection to the twin-deﬁcits/low-US-savings view is that US long-term real interest rates should 
be high if savings are deﬁcient, where in fact long-term real interest rates have been low.13 The implication at a 
minimum is that low US saving is not all that is going on.
Rising rest-of-world saving
One additional thing that could be going on is rising saving in the rest of the world. According to the global-
savings-glut interpretation of the US deﬁcit, other countries have boosted their saving since the second half of 6
the 1990s. They have to put their savings somewhere, and the US is a natural destination. In emerging Asia, 
savings have been supported by a heightened awareness of precautionary motives since the crises of 1997–98. 
In the PRC, rapid growth has combined with the underdevelopment of ﬁnancial markets and the absence of a 
social safety net to stimulate the development of enormously high savings rates.14  In Japan, slow growth and 
associated deﬂation have depressed private consumption (although the rise in national saving has been limited 
by the sharp fall in public saving and the ongoing process of population ageing). 
These interpretations have direct implications for the sustainability of global imbalances. In the PRC, consumption 
will adjust sooner or later to higher living standards. The development of ﬁnancial markets, the creation of a social 
safety net, and rapid population ageing after 2015 will boost household consumption. It is implausible that the 
PRC will continue to save 50% of its national income indeﬁnitely. Similar arguments implying similar adjustments 
can be made about other emerging Asian economies. Japanese consumers for their part will have less incentive 
to defer spending when deﬂation ﬁnally gives way to inﬂation.15  Data for 2003–04 are consistent with this view: 
they show consumption as the most important component of aggregate demand in these years in Asia ex PRC.16   
The implication is that as Asia’s savings rates fall, the region’s current account surplus will narrow, requiring the 
US deﬁcit to shrink. 
This perspective emphasizing high savings in Asia would predict that the US current account deﬁcit should be 
fully matched by the Asian current account surplus, where in fact, as we saw earlier, this is only partially the 
case.17 More generally, quantitative support for the hypothesis of a rise in global savings is weak. The exception 
is the PRC, where global savings is up by nearly 10% of GDP between 1991 and 2004, and to a lesser extent the 
rest of developing Asia.18 Savings rates in both the euro area and Japan actually fell signiﬁcantly over this period. 
This does not mean that the behavior of global savings is irrelevant to the emergence of global imbalances, but 
it does suggest that it is not all that is going on.
Declining rest-of-world investment
The other part of the story, necessarily, is the decline in investment rates in Japan (where investment is down 
by 9% of GDP since 1991), the euro area (where it is down by 3% of GDP over the same period), and emerging 
Asia ex PRC (where it is down by some 5% of GDP since prior to the onset of the crisis in 1997 for the Newly 
Industrializing Economies [NIEs] and by nearly 10% of GDP for the big four ASEAN economies).19  Explanations 
can be offered for the behavior of investment in each of these countries and regions. In Japan, the fall in 
investment is the direct consequence of a decade of deﬂation and stagnation. In the euro area, it reﬂects slow 
growth resulting from the combined effects of ﬁscal consolidation and difﬁcult structural reform. In emerging Asia 
ex PRC, it is the result of a disruptive ﬁnancial crisis and then of a conscious decision to run economies under 
lower pressure of demand and thereby to accumulate international reserves. 
As in the case of savings, these explanations shed light on future prospects. If Japan is now exiting from its 
extended bout of deﬂation, then there is reason to expect that investment there will rise. Sooner or later structural 
reform will begin boosting growth and investment rates in the euro area. There is already some sign of investment 
14 To be sure, the positive effect of growth rates on savings rates is paradoxical from the point of view of the life-cycle model (which 
would predict that higher incomes in the future should encourage higher consumption now and therefore lower savings, other things 
equal), but the evidentiary basis of this correlation is overwhelming. See, among others, IMF (2005b). It would appear to reﬂect inertia 
in consumption (that is, lags in the adjustment of consumption levels to higher incomes).
15 As already noted, Japanese savings rates have been falling despite the depressing impact on consumption of expected future price 
declines, reﬂecting the dominant inﬂuence of other factors, such as ageing of the population. For more on this, see below.
16 BIS (2005), p.43.
17 And there is no comparable story for why savings should be so high in, inter alia, Europe.
18 Data in this paragraph are from BIS (2005).
19 Rajan (2005), Figure 4. In an accounting sense, changes in investment and savings behavior combine to produce changes in current 
account balances. In an economic sense, the generality and magnitude of this investment swing indicate that investment behavior is 
an important part of the explanation for the emergence of global imbalances.7
20 Eichengreen (2005a) uses panel data for a sample of countries to estimate the determinants of investment rates.  An Asia crisis dummy 
is signiﬁcant in explaining the downward shift in investment in Asia after 1996.  But an additional variable measuring the number of years 
since the onset of the crisis is also signiﬁcant in explaining the recovery of investment in Asia in subsequent years.
21 See for example Cooper (2004), Clarida (2005), and Backus and Lambert (2005).
22 The latest ﬁgures show productivity growth having accelerated from less than 3% per annum before 2000 to more than 4% per annum 
after 2001. A good summary of these productivity trends is Timmer et al. (2004).
23 Again, on the calculations of BIS (2005).
24 As noted above.
25 The strength of the dollar in the ﬁnal quarter of 2005 is, at one level, hard to reconcile with this view.  The greenback appears to have 
been pushed up by private capital ﬂows toward the US. But those ﬂows presumably reﬂected the asymmetric tightening of the Fed and 
foreign central banks. Higher interest rates in the US made it attractive to borrow in other, lower-interest-rate markets and invest in US 
deposits and debt securities. Presumably this is a transitory phenomenon, however, that will come to an end once other central banks 
move in the same direction as the Fed.
rates recovering part way toward precrisis levels in ASEAN and the NIEs.20 And, absent changes in savings rates 
in these parts of the world, increases in investment will move their current accounts toward balance, necessarily 
implying a decline in the US deﬁcit.
Buoyant US investment 
This discussion of US saving, foreign saving, and foreign investment has covered three of the four elements 
contributing to global imbalances. Inevitably there is a fourth school of thought focusing on the attractiveness of 
investment in the US.21 This is consistent with the concentration of deﬁcits—with the view that because the US 
deﬁcit is so much larger than the surplus of any other single region, the imbalance must stem ﬁrst and foremost 
from developments in the US. It is consistent with the literature on the US emphasizing accelerating productivity 
growth, owing to US development and application of new information and communications technologies. It is 
consistent with high imputed rates of return on capital and relatively high level of asset valuations, presumably 
reﬂecting buoyant expectations of future US corporate proﬁts. It is consistent with evidence of rapid productivity 
growth in the US nonfarm sector, which had already accelerated in the second half of the 1990s but has grown 
still more pronounced since.22 
The problem is that these trends have not translated into a visible rise in US investment, which in fact fell by 2% 
as a share of US GDP between the 1990s and 2004.23  High corporate earnings have stimulated not so much 
corporate investment as corporate saving, which is currently high.24  
Moreover, both foreign direct investment (FDI) in the US and net purchases of equities by nonresidents declined 
after 2000. Since 2001, US investment in foreign equity markets has consistently exceeded foreign investment 
in the US equities. Rather, it has ﬂowed into US government debt. It is hard to imagine that nonresidents have 
rushed into US government debt because they are impressed by rapid productivity growth in the US nonfarm 
business sector. Moreover, since 2001, the main source of capital inﬂows into the US has been foreign central 
banks, not private investors. It is hard to imagine that foreign central banks, which are not typical proﬁt-maximizing 
investors, are motivated by high expected returns on investment in the US. None of these observations is easy to 
square with the view of global imbalances emphasizing the singular attractiveness of investment in the US.25
Not a problem
How do the “New Bretton Woods,” “Global Co-Dependency,” and “Dark Matter” views, according to which the 
US current account deﬁcit is not a problem, ﬁt into these paradigms?  According to the ﬁrst two of these theories, 
both the US and Asia are happy to see the current constellation of imbalances persist. Asian countries continue 
to intervene to prevent their currencies from rising against the dollar because the stimulus to exports is socially 
beneﬁcial. Countries like the PRC have unlimited supplies of labor that can be made available to the modern 
sector at prevailing wages; this distortion warrants using the exchange rate to boost proﬁtability in the modern 
sector where rural workers can be productively employed. Or it is argued that the export sector is the locus of 8
26 Which is why they are appealing.
27 For the literature on this, see Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant (1966).
learning by doing and productivity growth. Here again, the theory of the second best suggests that imposing 
another distortion on the ﬁrms in question—undervaluing the exchange rate to encourage them to engage in 
additional export-oriented activity—is beneﬁcial from a social point of view. Or it is argued that the inefﬁciency of 
Asian ﬁnancial markets provides a rationale for routing ﬁnancial resources through the US. Asian countries use 
their savings to invest in US debt securities, and American managers use FDI to invest in PRC manufacturing. 
The US, for its part, is equally happy to be the importer of last resort on the basis of an overvalued dollar, since 
America is the ultimate consumer society.
Each of these variants of the so-called Global Co-Dependency view contains an element of truth.26  But stories 
about unlimited supplies of rural labor willing to work at near-subsistence wages are limited to the PRC and a 
few other Asian economies. Together this accounts for only a minority of Asia’s surplus and are counterparties 
for an even smaller fraction of the US deﬁcit. Stories about the PRC circumventing the inefﬁciency of domestic 
ﬁnancial markets—by routing its savings through the US—founder on the fact that only a relatively small fraction 
of PRC inward FDI comes from the US. Stories about the export sector being disproportionately the locus of 
learning-by-doing are largely undocumented and in any case cannot explain why Asian countries seek to prevent 
their currencies from rising against the dollar as opposed to other currencies, when they in fact export to a wide 
range of ﬁnancial markets.
More generally, Global Co-Dependency stories are hard to square with the observation that current accounts 
reﬂect savings-investment imbalances. Even if the PRC prefers to route a signiﬁcant fraction of its saving through 
foreign ﬁnancial markets and to re-import it subsequently in the form of inward FDI, this does not explain why 
its saving should exceed its investment (that is, why its current account should be in surplus). Even if the US is 
acting as banker to the world, importing short-term capital and exporting long-term capital, this does not imply 
that its current account should be in deﬁcit; in the 1960s, when the US was similarly characterized as banker to 
the world, it in fact ran persistent current account surpluses.27  Even if Asian economies seek to encourage the 
export sector as the locus of learning externalities, it does not follow that they need to export more than they 
import.
Thus, the argument that the trans-Paciﬁc imbalance persists because the US and Asian countries see it as 
mutually advantageous is less than convincing. This means that it is also less than reassuring about future 
prospects.
A related story, due to Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2005), is that the current situation is sustainable because 
the current account statistics are misleading. If the US is really saving signiﬁcantly less than it is investing 
year after year, one should expect net foreign indebtedness and net interest payments to nonresidents to rise 
with time. In fact this has not been the case. Although the US ran cumulative current account deﬁcits of some 
$4,500 billion between 1980 and 2004, the country’s net foreign assets should have fallen by the same amount, 
and the annual return on its foreign ﬁnancial position should have fallen by, say, 5% of that amount ($210 billion, 
assuming a required rate of return of 5%). But, in fact, the return on the US net foreign ﬁnancial position remained 
essentially unchanged between 1980 and 2004. In effect, US foreign assets appreciated in value relative to US 
foreign liabilities, allowing the country to continue earning a positive return on its net foreign ﬁnancial position.
For Hausmann and Sturzenegger, the explanation for this anomaly is that unrecorded US exports of managerial, 
organizational, and technological expertise (“dark matter”) show up in increases in the market value of US 
foreign investments relative to their ofﬁcial recorded value. The failure of the balance-of-payments statistics to 
capture the value of this exported know-how creates a gap between ofﬁcial valuations at the time the foreign 
investment occurs and the subsequent market valuation of US foreign investments that seems to persist over a 
period of decades. In this view, the US current account deﬁcit is not a problem because the recorded deﬁcit is 
systematically understates the value of US production and savings.9
It is hard to dispute the authors’ basic premise, since payments on the US net foreign ﬁnancial position have 
not moved deep into negative territory. On Hausmann and Sturzenegger’s assumption—that US companies 
are more sophisticated investors in Asia and can expect a higher return than their Asian counterparts—their 
conclusions are consistent: chronic US deﬁcits will not then translate into proportionate increases in US foreign 
indebtedness. In effect, the factor services associated with that ﬁnancial sophistication and managerial expertise 
are underreported in the statistics on the current account.
In fact, the observation that US foreign assets earn higher returns than US foreign liabilities, and that this has 
been true of FDI in particular, is not unfamiliar. Gourinchas and Rey (2005) ﬁnd that US assets have consistently 
earned higher returns than US liabilities; indeed, this differential is not limited to FDI. The authors observe that, if 
anything, this differential has grown over time (the rate of return differential is now larger than it was prior to the 
collapse of Bretton Woods). They observe that the overall differential may have been increased by compositional 
effects in recent years as US foreign investment has been skewed more dramatically in the direction of high-
yielding equity and FDI. 
The 2% premium earned by US foreign assets over US foreign liabilities estimated by Gourinchas and Rey as 
the average for 1952–2005 suggests that the US does not have to make net interest payments to foreigners 
until the ratio of external debt to GDP reaches 30%.28 Perhaps coincidentally, the country should breach this 
threshold in 2006 or 2007. Thus, the fact that the US has earned premia on its foreign investments helps the 
country sustain larger current account deﬁcits than would be possible otherwise. But it does not permit it to print 
foreign liabilities without limit.
A still more fundamental question is whether one can be conﬁdent that this differential will persist. Just because 
Japanese investors in the past mistakenly bought golf courses in California and skyscrapers in Manhattan does 
not mean that Asia’s foreign direct investments will earn equally low returns in the future. Those responsible for 
PRC foreign investment appear to have more appetite for US oil companies and laptop computer producers than 
they do for golf courses. Within the general category of FDI, it is no longer clear that US foreign investments 
should be more productive than their foreign counterparts. As Setser (2005) puts it, “It is sort of hard to believe 
that Toyota’s US operations are massively less proﬁtable than GM’s European operations.” And even where this 
has been the case in the past, it is hard to believe that it will remain the case in the future. 
In addition, the more foreign investors grow worried about the sustainability of the US international ﬁnancial 
position, the higher the risk premium they will demand in order to hold claims on the US. The rates of return 
considered by Hausmann and Sturzenegger will then behave not like immutable conditions but as endogenous 
variables. A shift toward rate-of-return parity has already occurred within the subcategory of debt securities, where 
US interest rates have risen relative to foreign interest rates. As Setser notes, the US income balance already 
moved into deﬁcit in the second quarter of 2005. This renders Hausmann and Sturzenegger’s regularity—that 
the US continues to receive net interest income abroad, in the range of $30 billion a year, regardless of whatever 
changes in the net foreign asset data may be recorded—no more than an historical curiosum. While currency 
strategists have been wrong before, those of Bank of America (2005) forecast that the US income balance—the 
balance between income earned on foreign investments by US entities minus income paid by US entities to the 
foreign sector—will shift from a surplus of $30 billion in 2004 to a deﬁcit of $75–85 billion in 2006.
Finally, those who insist that global imbalances are not a problem can point to the fact that there was only 
limited depreciation of the dollar in 2003–05. In standard economics, when market participants expect that an 
event will occur later, they have an incentive to start taking appropriate positions now. Thus, arguments that the 
dollar will have to decline signiﬁcantly in the future imply that a signiﬁcant weakening of the dollar should have 
already taken place in earlier years. That the dollar was relatively stable in 2003–04 and actually strengthened 
28 Data for recent years suggest a higher threshold because the rate-of-return differential is larger, which reﬂects the aforementioned shift 
in US foreign investment further in the direction of equity and FDI.
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in 2005 is a problem from this point of view. A number of explanations can be offered for this anomaly. Most 
signiﬁcantly, the Fed tightened signiﬁcantly in 2005, and it tightened faster than foreign central banks, enhancing 
yields that attracted capital ﬂows toward the US.29 In addition, 2005 and early 2006 was a period of high oil 
prices, creating surpluses for petroleum-exporting countries, which traditionally park their foreign balances in 
dollars. But standard arguments suggest that these should be only transient effects. Higher interest rates in the 
US only aggravate debt-sustainability concerns unless they translate into less absorption and a smaller current 
account deﬁcit. Even if high oil prices persist, petroleum-producing countries will presumably learn to diversify 
their reserves. In any case, the sharp fall in the dollar in the second quarter of 2006 (when this draft was being 
ﬁnalized) suggests that this anomaly may be dissolving.
What an orderly correction would look like 
The implications of the preceding discussion for exchange rate dynamics depend in part on which story or 
combination of stories one believes. But, as Giavazzi (2006) explains, regardless of whether one believes that 
the US current account mainly reﬂects a shift in demand toward foreign goods (the deﬁcient US saving view) or 
an increase in the foreign demand for US assets (the excessive foreign saving view), the common implication 
is that the dollar will have to fall against foreign currencies. In the ﬁrst scenario, the increase in US imports and 
net foreign debt causes the exchange rate to begin falling immediately. In the second scenario, in contrast, the 
increase in the foreign demand for US assets leads to some strengthening of the dollar on impact—compatible 
with actual exchange rate behavior—but similarly implies depreciation subsequently as foreign demands for 
additional US assets come to be satisﬁed and US exports must rise in order to service the additional net foreign 
debt. A range of models based on alternative assumptions (see for example Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2005, Caballero, 
Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2005, Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa, 2005) all point to a dollar depreciation of about 30% 
relative to the levels prevailing at the end of 2004. All of these models suggest that, in a well-behaved perfect 
foresight equilibrium, this adjustment can be spread out over a number of years.
III.   The Danger of a Disorderly Correction
These  models,  which  assume  well-behaved  perfect  foresight  equilibria,  have  in  common  the  premise  that 
investors understand the need for the dollar to fall in the future and act accordingly, causing the dollar to begin 
falling now. The rate of change of the exchange rate validates expectations and is precisely the amount needed 
to propel the exchange rate and US net foreign debt to their long-run equilibrium levels.
Among other things, these models of equilibrium dynamics assume the absence of self-fulﬁlling bubbles. In 
a bubbly model, many different expectation-consistent paths are possible. If, for whatever reason, investors 
expect that the dollar will appreciate, then they will bid up its value now, producing an outcome that validates 
their expectations. Insofar as this affects interest rates and relative prices, the US current account deﬁcit will 
be larger and the rate of growth of US net foreign debt will be faster than on the saddle-point stable equilibrium 
path. Bubbles cannot grow without limit, and at some point the dollar bubble described in the previous paragraph 
would have to pop. With the US net foreign debt having grown, the dollar would then have to fall more sharply 
than in the equilibrium scenario, in order to crowd in the additional net exports needed to service the debt.
What would this correction look like? Imagine that the US current account deﬁcit is allowed to continue widening, 
from 6% of US GDP in 2004 to 10% of US GDP in 2010. With a deﬁcit ratio of 10% of GDP and a rate of nominal 
GDP growth of 5%, the US ratio of external debt to GDP would only begin to level off when it approaches 200%. 
This is a dramatically higher level of external indebtedness than we have ever seen for a large country. It is 
simply implausible that foreign investors would willingly absorb such massive quantities of US debt.
29 Eventually, one would expect this tightening to slow the rate of growth of US absorption, either smoothly in the context of a growth 
slowdown or abruptly in the context of a recession. That no slowdown was evident in 2005 is presumably attributable to the fact that 
monetary policy works with long and variable lags. By the spring of 2006, cooling of the US housing market suggested that such a 
slowdown was in train, although its impact on absorption was still not apparent.11
If this conclusion is accepted, it follows that at some point purchases by foreign investors of US assets will 
decline below 10% of US GDP. As capital inﬂows tail off, the current account deﬁcit will narrow by deﬁnition, 
and US external indebtedness will converge to a lower steady-state ratio to GDP. The key question—aside from 
what an acceptable steady-state ratio is—is whether that correction begins now, so that adjustment can proceed 
smoothly, or whether the correction is delayed until the equilibrium debt ratio is approached, at which point foreign 
ﬁnance would dry up abruptly and the US current account deﬁcit would have to be eliminated at a stroke. 
In this latter scenario, the consequence unavoidably would be very sharp compression of US and global demand. 
If capital inﬂows into the US decline by 6.5% of GDP (their current level) because foreign ﬁnance dries up 
completely, then the current account must move immediately to balance, by deﬁnition of the balance of payments. 
The result on impact would be for US demand and speciﬁcally US net demand for imports to decline by 6.5%. To 
repeat, a 6 5% decline in US demand is a recipe for a decline in global output in the amount of 6.5% of US GDP, 
other things equal. The second-round effects following this fall in production could then aggravate the impact on 
output and employment.
How would changes in relative prices work to bring about this result? A decline in net foreign purchases of 
dollar assets would cause the dollar to fall. It would put downward pressure on the prices of dollar-denominated 
assets—equivalently, their yields would rise, eliminating the Greenspan Conundrum of low long-term interest 
rates. Note that these two effects are two sides of the same coin: a declining dollar and higher US interest rates 
accompany one another as a result of interest parity. Insofar as a falling dollar augurs imported inﬂation, the Fed 
would then be forced to raise policy rates faster than expected. Higher interest rates across the term structure 
would then damp down household spending by raising the cost of consumer credit and limiting the rise in housing 
prices that have worked to sustain household net wealth in the absence of positive personal saving. They would 
discourage investment by raising the cost of capital. The fact that US interest rates have recently risen relative to 
foreign interest rates is at least superﬁcially consistent with the notion that the market attaches a rising probability 
to this scenario.
To be sure, US output and employment can be sustained if net imports are reduced by boosting US exports. 
This is consistent with the observation that the dollar will fall because of the curtailment of capital inﬂows. But the 
scenario in question is highly optimistic; the empirical literature generally suggests that signiﬁcant lengths of time 
have to pass before changes in the relative price of exports produce changes in export volumes. And even under 
this optimistic scenario, the compression of US demand does not disappear; it is simply shifted to the rest of the 
world. For countries other than the US, this would not be a happy outcome. It would mean a shift in demand away 
from their products. The result would be some redistribution of the recessionary impulse from the US to other 
countries but no mitigation of the overall recessionary effects. 
A frequently-heard objection to this story is that foreign central banks would never allow ﬁnancing for the US 
deﬁcit to be curtailed so abruptly. Foreign monetary authorities are aware that they have an interest in maintaining 
the ﬂow of external ﬁnance for the US current account deﬁcit precisely in order to avoid precipitating a recession. 
They would step in with further purchases of US assets if private investors pulled the plug. 
But foreign central banks also have an interest in avoiding capital losses on their dollar reserves. Selling US 
Treasury and agency securities for, say, German bunds represents a gross capital outﬂow that would offset the 
ongoing ﬂow of incremental ﬁnance. In addition, central banks worry about the impact on domestic monetary 
conditions and inﬂation by running large ongoing surpluses. They worry about the resource misallocation that 
results from keeping interest rates artiﬁcially low.30 They worry about the present or prospective future costs of 
sterilizing the ﬁnancial effects. There is thus an incentive to diversify out of dollars if they think they can do so 
without prompting reserve diversiﬁcation by other central banks and precipitating a signiﬁcant deprecation of the 
dollar. There is also an incentive to let their currencies rise if they think they can limit the effects.
30 Effects that are most clearly evident in the PRC in the form of investment rates that are surely too high to be consistent with efﬁcient 
allocation of resources.12
To be clear, nothing guarantees that the US deﬁcit will be compressed abruptly and that recessionary tendencies 
will follow. But neither can this possibility be ruled out. In any case, focusing on this worst-case scenario is useful 
for contemplating the implications for emerging markets. 
IV.  Channels through which Asia’s Emerging Markets may be Affected
World Bank (2005) enumerates the channels through which the curtailment of capital ﬂows toward the US—
leading to a sharp depreciation of the dollar and sudden compression of the country’s current account—may 
impact emerging markets in Asia and the rest of the world.
Financial Effects
On the positive side, a declining US exchange rate would reduce the cost to emerging markets of servicing 
dollar-denominated debt. This would amplify an effect already evident between 2002 and 2004, when a declining 
dollar reduced ratios of debt to GNP and debt service to exports by one percentage point in emerging markets.3 
This effect favors heavily-indebted countries where the reduction of debt burdens is particularly valuable, as well 
as dollar borrowers. In practice this means mainly Latin American countries like Brazil, Chile, and Columbia, 
where the World Bank estimates that the fall in the dollar between 2002 and 2004 reduced the ratio of debt to 
exports by 4–10%.32 In comparison, these beneﬁts will be minor in emerging Asia (according to World Bank staff 
estimates, only India and Thailand experienced modest beneﬁts in 2002–04).
On the negative side, rising US interest rates and declining US Treasury prices could precipitate a ﬂight to quality 
that heightens volatility in emerging ﬁnancial markets. The curtailment of capital ﬂows toward the US would make 
for higher US Treasury benchmarks and wider emerging-market bond spreads for borrowers with high ratios of 
debt to GDP. The assumption here is that US policy rates are important for the evolution of global interest rates 
and that both emerging market spreads and capital ﬂows co-vary with the level of global rates. World Bank 
estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in US interest rates raises debt service as a share of 
exports of goods and services by 3% in both South and East Asia. This compares with 7% in emerging Europe 
and Central Asia and 13% in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Finally, emerging markets will feel negative wealth effects from capital losses on foreign reserves. Figure 1 
highlights this by documenting the massive accumulation of reserves by developing countries since 1999. 
According to the most recent IMF data (for the third quarter of 2005), about 60% of the reserves of developing 
countries for which currency composition is known, or $850 billion, are in US dollars.33  A 20% depreciation of the 
dollar would thus translate into a $170 billion capital loss for this group of countries.
It is important to recall, however, that depreciation of the dollar implies the appreciation of other currencies. 
Imagine for example that the dollar depreciates against the euro and the yen while emerging-market currencies 
do not move on an effective basis—that they appreciate by 10% against the dollar while depreciating by 10% 
against the euro and the yen.34 This takes as a starting point the back-of-the-envelope assumption that trade 
with the dollar bloc and trade with the euro area and Japan together are of roughly equal importance for this 
group of countries. Now capital losses on dollar reserves are largely offset by capital gains on reserves in other 
currencies. Exposure is limited to the 30% of developing country reserves held in dollars that are not hedged 
in this way.35  Assuming a 10% depreciation of the dollar against emerging Asian currencies, this now implies a 
31 World Bank (2005), p.52.  
32 And to a lesser extent South Africa and Turkey.
33 30%, or some $425 billion, is held in euros and the bulk of the remainder in Japanese yen.
34 This is only one of a range of assumptions that might be plausible about the reaction of emerging market currencies to a sharp drop in 
the dollar. Alternatives are considered below.
35 Note that these calculations ignore the 10% of developing-country reserves held in other currencies. In practice these tend to be Swiss 
francs, pounds sterling etc. Assuming, as seems plausible, that these currencies react in the same fashion as the euro would only 
reinforce the conclusions about to follow.13
 
capital loss of $45 billion, a much smaller if still not inconsequential number. If, on the other hand, the currencies 
of the PRC and the other emerging Asian countries are allowed to rise more sharply against the dollar, capital 
losses would be larger.
This emphasis on the ﬁnancial market implications of a fall in the dollar reﬂects the intellectual sway of the 
ﬁnancial-crisis paradigm of the 1990s, when sudden stops in capital coincident with a ﬂight to quality in the 
advanced countries were the immediate way in which emerging markets were affected (see Calvo, 1998). This 
time around, the ﬁnancial consequences may be more ambiguous and less obviously damaging to emerging 
markets. For one thing, the positive correlation between US interest rates and emerging market spreads may be 
less pronounced and less stable than suggested in the World Bank’s analysis. For a number of countries and 
periods this correlation has been essentially nonexistent (Eichengreen and Mody, 1998). In particular, as credit 
ratings improve across emerging Asia, the sensitivity of spreads to US interest rates should diminish. 
Beyond this, the response of emerging market spreads will depend on the reason for the rise in US interest 
rates and on the reaction of the other advanced countries. If monetary tightening in America simply reﬂects the 
desire to normalize US policy rates as the Fed works to back out the lingering impact of the anti-recessionary 
and anti-deﬂationary interest rate reductions at the beginning of the decade, then it is plausible that rates in other 
countries should also rise as gross ﬁnancial ﬂows from the US to foreign markets are deterred by rising yields 
at home. The saving grace is that the increase in interest rates in the ﬁnancial centers will be gradual, as the 
Fed and other central banks weigh the advantages of higher rates for the maintenance of price stability against 
any negative implications for economic growth. And a gradual increase in rates should be relatively easy for 
emerging markets to absorb.
If, on the other hand, the impetus for higher US interest rates stems from a sudden evaporation of the willingness 
of foreign investors to ﬁnance America’s current account deﬁcit and from the inﬂationary effects of the consequent 
fall in the dollar, then higher interest rates in the US will be accompanied by lower interest rates in the rest of the 
world. With less liquidity ﬂowing to the US, more liquidity will remain in other markets. The interest differential 
described here is also a straightforward implication of the interest parity condition, given the assumption of 
a sharp fall in the dollar. In other words, foreign interest rates must be lower than US rates by the amount 
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rates in the US are accompanied by lower rates in Europe, then it is not obvious that emerging markets will be 
adversely affected.
For emerging markets to feel strongly negative effects, one must append another mechanism that produces a 
sharp drop in global liquidity. A candidate would be a sharp adjustment in US asset prices that produces distress, 
or even fears of distress, among ﬁnancial institutions, as happened in the bond market correction of 1994 and the 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis of 1998. Such fears could prompt de-leveraging by both foreign 
and US ﬁnancial institutions, reducing global liquidity. They could produce a global ﬂight to quality and a sharp 
reduction in the appetite for emerging market debt, as happened in these earlier periods.36
A problem for this storyline is that emerging markets have greatly reduced their dependence on new foreign 
borrowing since the bond market crisis of 1994 and LTCM-Russia crisis of 1998. The fact that they are running 
current account surpluses means that they have little need for additional foreign borrowing. In many cases they 
are reducing net external debt by accumulating reserves. To be sure, if the US current account shifts from deﬁcit 
to balance, current accounts in Asia and Latin America will have to move toward balance as well (assuming that 
Europe’s current account balance remains where it is, at approximately zero). This will still mean no need for 
additional borrowing. 
Where debt is maturing, of course, it will have to be rolled over. But few emerging Asian countries are in this 
position. Those few Asian economies with such needs took advantage of favorable ﬁnancial conditions to pre-
fund the renewal of maturing issues in the ﬁrst half of 2004. (The Philippines is an exception, as it avoided pre-
funding future borrowing because of budgetary costs.)37
Given all this, emerging markets should be largely insulated from the ﬁnancial consequences of higher interest 
rates. The main exceptions are Ecuador and Turkey and countries with large amounts of interest-rate-indexed 
debt such as Brazil. (In Brazil, domestic debt has an average duration of less than a year and over half is still 
linked to the overnight interest rate.) But few Asian countries are in this position. And, in any case, recall our 
earlier skepticism that global rebalancing would mean higher global rates.
Real Effects
Compared to this emphasis on ﬁnancial effects, the World Bank’s analysis neglects what is potentially the most 
important negative channel through which Asian markets will be affected, namely the impact on trade. The abrupt 
elimination of foreign ﬁnancing for the US current account would force the net imports of the US to decline by 
36 A variation on this theme is how the story was told in the heyday of the Bretton Woods System, when global liquidity was measured as 
the sum of the US monetary base plus dollar reserves held by foreign central banks. In this model, a reduction in the rate of growth of 
the US monetary base reduced not just US liquidity but also global liquidity, as it meant that foreign central banks were accumulating 
reserves less quickly. On reﬂection, it will be evident that this variant of the story requires exchange rates to be pegged to the dollar, for 
otherwise the monetary base and liquidity in the rest of the world could move independently of dollar reserves. To put it another way, 
only if currencies are pegged will foreign policies and conditions mimic US policies, as was the case under Bretton Woods; only then 
will the US be able to act as Stackelberg leader in the global liquidity game. While there is some evidence of this mechanism working in 
the recent past (see for example Jensen, 2005), if foreigners abruptly grow unwilling to ﬁnance the US deﬁcit and allow their exchange 
rates to move, this assumption will be violated.
37 For their part, many Latin American and Eastern European countries with maturing debts have pre-funded their re-ﬁnancing needs while 
the going is good. Venezuela was already pre-ﬁnancing debt for 2006 in the middle of 2005; by mid-2005 Mexico had already covered its 
ﬁnancing requirements through the end of 2007. Excluding Ecuador, whose external ﬁnancing needs are considerable, Latin American 
net ﬁnancing needs in 2006 are less than 3% of exports, down from more than 30% in 1996–98. Ecuador’s net ﬁnancing need is more 
than 70% of exports in 2006, driving up the regional average. Note that all these calculations make assumptions about the continuing 
ﬂow of FDI and ofﬁcial ﬁnance, mainly from the IMF. They assume away the danger of large-scale capital ﬂight. Excluding Turkey, which 
also has a large current account deﬁcit, only half of which is ﬁnanced by FDI, and large amounts of debt to roll over, emerging Europe’s 
net ﬁnancial needs will be less than 7% of exports, down from nearly 24% in 1996–98.  Including Turkey they will average about 10%. If 
funding suddenly becomes unavailable, Latin American countries still could retire their maturing obligations and meet their other external 
ﬁnancial needs by liquidating just 10% of their reserves. The comparable ﬁgure for emerging Europe is 11%. Alternatively, closing this 
gap by increasing net exports would require only a 1% depreciation of Latin American currencies (5% including Ecuador) and a 3% 
depreciation of emerging European currencies (5% including Turkey), by Deutsche Bank estimates.  See Deutsche Bank (2005).15
6.5% of US GDP. This could have serious consequences for emerging markets, more serious than the impact of 
higher interest rates. 
Since it will take time for dollar depreciation to crowd in US exports, assume that the entire swing comes in the 
form of US imports. Assume also that the dollar falls by the same amount against all foreign currencies (this 
restrictive assumption will relaxed momentarily). The impact on other regions will then depend on the importance 
of exports to the US as a share of regional GDP.38 In data for 2004 this share varies from a high of 23% in the 
small highly-open East Asian economies (Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and Taipei,China) to a low of 4% in 
the euro area and Japan (Table 1). In between, one ﬁnds the Anglo Saxon economies (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom), the larger East Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic 
of Korea, and Thailand) and the PRC at the high end, at 15%, 13%, and 15% respectively, and Latin America at 
the low end, at 7%.39  
It ﬂows from this focus on trade that a disorderly correction of the US current account will have the largest 
impact on emerging markets most dependent on exports to the US, which means above all the small entrepot 
economies of Asia.40  Looking at the issue comparatively, East Asia is more vulnerable than Latin America mainly 
because the Asian region is more open and not inconsiderably linked to the US.
A more nuanced analysis would allow different currencies to appreciate against the dollar to different extents. One 
can imagine, for example, that Asian countries continue to peg their currencies to the dollar at current levels while 
European countries allow the euro to ﬂoat upward against it, and Latin American countries split the difference 
(they allow their currencies to appreciate against the dollar by half as much as do European countries). In this 
scenario Asian currencies depreciate on an effective basis, since they remain unchanged against the dollar but 
depreciate against the euro and Latin American currencies. Whether individual Latin currencies appreciate or 
depreciate on an effective basis then depends on whether the country issuing them exports mainly to the US and 
Asia or to Europe. Looking across emerging-market regions, this scenario would be relatively happy for Asia, 
since the deterioration in its export competitiveness will be minimal. By comparison it would not be a happy one 
for Latin America, since it will have to bear more of the global adjustment burden given the absence of an Asian 
contribution.
Alternatively, one can imagine a scenario in which Asian countries are more inclined than countries in other 
parts of the world to allow their currencies to appreciate against the dollar, reﬂecting the relatively robust health 
of the Asian economies. While Asian currencies then appreciate unambiguously, the magnitude of their effective 
appreciation will depend on the share of the exports of the issuing country destined for the US. 
Truman (2005a) has elaborated several such scenarios. In his ﬁrst, the euro rises by 40% against the dollar, 
Asian currencies by 20%, and Latin American currencies by 15%. Asia’s effective nominal exchange rates then 
remain essentially unchanged, because its currencies appreciate relative to the dollar but depreciate relative to 
the euro; this is true for each individual Asian country as well as for the regional aggregate. In Latin America, 
in contrast, the effective regional exchange rate appreciates by 6% despite the fact that revaluation against the 
dollar is smaller. This reﬂects the fact that more of the region’s trade is directed toward the US. This effect is 
driven by Mexico and Venezuela, which see their effective rates rise by 9% and 7%, respectively. (We may want 
to disregard the second effect as reﬂecting mainly the fact that oil is priced in dollars, something that will not 
remain the case indeﬁnitely.) Brazil, in contrast, continues to enjoy a 3% effective depreciation. 
38 And, as well, on the relevant relative price elasticity of import demand.
39 Oil exporters also rely heavily on the US for their ﬁnal market, but they are a special case.
40 We may wish to place less stress on the very high ratios of exports to the US to GDP for these small Asian countries on the ground that 
the domestic content of those exports is relatively low. A proper input-output model with a role for imports and exports would then be 
needed to analyze the impact.16
Table 1: Trade by Region, 2004 (% of regional GDP)
  US Japan Anglo 
Saxon
Other 
Industrial Large Euro Small Euro
US … 1.6 4.9 0.4 1.9 1.2
Japan 4.1 … 1.6 0.3 1.5 1.0
Anglo Saxon 14.5 1.9 … 1.2 7.0 5.7
Other Industrial 4.6 1.5 4.9 … 21.5 11.5
Large Euro 3.2 1.0 3.7 3.1 … 13.3
Small Euro 4.7 1.5 6.9 3.8 27.0 …
East Asia 1 13.0 13.2 5.3 0.8 5.1 3.5
East Asia 2 22.5 22.7 14.8 3.4 12.5 7.9
PRC 14.9 10.2 4.6 0.8 6.5 3.6
Other Emerging Markets 4.9 1.3 3.4 0.9 7.2 4.7
Latin America 7.0 1.3 1.4 0.5 3.8 2.8
Oil-Producers 23.2 2.9 3.7 2.3 5.7 3.7








US 1.4 0.9 1.5 0.6 0.6 3.0
Japan 3.7 1.7 3.6 0.4 0.3 1.0
Anglo Saxon 1.6 1.1 1.5 1.2 0.3 1.3
Other Industrial 1.2 1.2 1.4 2.4 0.7 2.9
Large Euro 0.9 0.7 1.4 1.6 0.5 1.2
Small Euro 1.5 1.0 1.7 2.2 0.9 1.7
East Asia 1 … 10.3 12.3 2.3 1.0 3.2
East Asia 2 42.5 … 51.7 7.0 1.3 4.2
PRC 7.7 16.0 … 1.6 1.3 2.3
Other Emerging Markets 2.0 1.4 2.0 … 0.6 1.5
Latin America 1.4 0.4 2.4 1.0 … 2.1
Oil-Producers 2.5 0.8 1.9 1.6 1.4 …
Notes: The 12 regions deﬁned here are the US, Japan, Anglo Saxon (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United Kingdom), Other Industrial (Denmark, 
Sweden, and Switzerland), Large Euro (Italy, France, and Germany), Small Euro (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland,  Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain), East Asia 1 (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand), East Asia 2 (Hong Kong, and Singapore), PRC, Other 
Emerging Markets (Egypt, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, South Africa, and Turkey), Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and 
Peru), and Oil-Producers (Iran, Mexico, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela).
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics and International Financial Statistics.17
The contrasting scenario is one in which the rise in the euro against the dollar is limited to 20%, while the Asian 
currencies are allowed to appreciate against the dollar by 40% and the Latin American currencies continue to 
rise against the greenback by 15%. In this case, export growth slows across virtually all of Asia and other policy 
adjustments are needed to compensate for the demand shortfall. In Latin America, in contrast, the impact varies. 
Relative to the ﬁrst scenario, the impact on Mexico is unchanged; the country trades disproportionately with the 
US, appreciation of the peso against the dollar is all that matters, and by assumption this remains unchanged.
 Now, however, Brazil no longer enjoys a nominal depreciation, given the importance of its commodity exports to 
Asia and the fact that Asian currencies are appreciating.41  
A still more nuanced analysis would allow the effects to vary as a function of the commodity composition of 
countries’ exports. For example, a signiﬁcant slowdown in the US and a more modest slowdown in the PRC 
induced  by  the  appreciation  of  the  renminbi  would  have  a  particularly  pronounced  impact  on  commodity-
exporting countries. The rapid rate of increase in commodity prices in recent years has reﬂected strong demand 
emanating from these two countries, together with the rest of emerging Asia.42 If demand growth in the US and 
PRC—and hence demand growth globally—were to slow signiﬁcantly, the terms of trade of commodity exporters 
like Indonesia and Chile would be hit.
41 Another attempt to work through this arithmetic is Cline (2005). He ﬁrst identiﬁes the target foreign trade-weighted appreciation against 
the dollar needed to accomplish the requisite US current account adjustment. He then identiﬁes a target set of changes in current 
account balances of other countries, in effect distributing the requisite US adjustment among the country’s trading partners in a manner 
designed to maintain proportionality. The “optimal” realignment is taken as the one that exactly meets the overall target for foreign trade-
weighted appreciation of the dollar while minimizing the difference of the resulting set of country current account balances from the 
target set of current account balances. Within Asia, the resulting effective appreciation of currencies varies enormously, from a high of 
46% for Singapore; 17% for Japan; 13% for Malaysia; and 11% for Hong Kong, China; to a low of 5% for Thailand, 6% for the Republic 
of Korea, and, surprisingly, 8% for PRC. These ﬁgures provide an indication of the magnitude of the impact of global rebalancing on the 
respective economies, contingent on his assumptions.
42 By BIS (2005) estimates, the PRC accounted for about a third of incremental oil demand in 2004–5, while other emerging economies 
accounted for an additional 17%. 




1995 2000 2003 1995 2000 2003
Asia 1.1 2.2 2.2 0.15 0.15 0.143
China, People’s Rep. of 0.2 1.3 1.5 0.18 0.17 0.15
India 1.9 3.1 2.8 0.16 0.16 0.153
Korea, Rep. of 2.4 4.2 3.8 0.14 0.12 0.11
Other  0.6 1.5 1.9 0.14 0.15 0.153
Latin America5     –1.2 –2.1 –2.4 0.12 0.12 0.123
Central Europe6 1.5 2.0 1.4 0.10 0.09 0.083
Memo: G7 countries 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.06 0.05 0.05
1  Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials (SITC Rev. 3), as a percentage of nominal GDP. Negative values indicate 
that exports exceed imports. 
2  Barrels per unit of GDP at 1995 prices and US dollar exchange rates. 
3  2002. 
4  Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore, and Thailand. 
5  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
6  Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.18
Conversely, developing countries dependent on commodity imports, which means resource-poor East Asian 
countries and, to a lesser degree, Latin American countries like Brazil, would experience weaker commodity 
prices as a cushion against slower global growth.43 Here petroleum prices, whose procyclical movement is 
especially strong because of constraints on reﬁning capacity and their impact on countries like Mexico and 
Venezuela (along with their countervailing impact on the low-income oil-importing countries of Africa) are a case 
in point. In Asia the differential effects would be broadly negative while varying across countries. Table 2 shows 
that oil imports as a share of GDP are even more important in India, Republic of Korea, and Asia-ex PRC than 
they are for the PRC economy itself. 
Thus, a very sharp fall in the dollar that curtailed US demand for the exports of other regions would depress 
growth rates in emerging markets and conceivably precipitate even more serious disruptions. Of course, it would 
not be correct to infer from this that currency appreciation is necessarily a bad thing. The appreciation of Asian 
currencies, if it began early and proceeded gradually, would reduce the dependence of the region on exports to 
the US—which is precisely what one would want in a scenario where US import demand could implode. Stronger 
currencies mean lower import prices and higher living standards. They cut the cost of imported capital goods. The 
key question is therefore how the appreciation comes about—whether it begins early and proceeds gradually, so 
that the favorable effects dominate, or whether it is delayed and then occurs abruptly and discontinuously. And, 
in turn, which scenario obtains depends on how national governments prepare and respond to the event. 
V.   National Responses
A growing literature considers how Asian countries might respond to the risks posed by the current constellation 
of global imbalances. Unfortunately, much of that literature discusses exchange rate issues in isolation from 
other domestic and international economic policies. And it fails to distinguish the two questions identiﬁed in the 
introduction to this study. First, what policy adjustments should be implemented now while the trans-Paciﬁc 
imbalance persists? Are there policy initiatives that would minimize the danger of a disorderly correction and 
help to facilitate the adjustment of current accounts to sustainable levels? And second, if a disorderly correction 
nevertheless occurs, what policies should be implemented to minimize the danger of damaging consequences? 
In particular, how should Asian countries respond to a sharp fall in the level of the dollar if and when this 
occurs?
Both scenarios will unfold more smoothly if Asian governments begin now in implementing a comprehensive set 
of policy adjustments. Domestically, this means using macroeconomic policies to stimulate consumption and 
implementing structural reforms designed to further reduce dependence on exports. A tighter exchange-rate-cum-
monetary policy will create pressure for Asian currencies to appreciate against the dollar and foreign currencies in 
general. Demand will then begin to rotate away from exports in favor of domestically-produced goods, narrowing 
the region’s current account surplus. But to avoid precipitating a signiﬁcant slowdown in economic growth, this 
monetary tightening should be combined with some loosening of other macroeconomic policies, ﬁscal policies in 
particular, in order to maintain the overall level of demand.44  
Fiscal expansion
Although there is an argument for monetary tightening and currency appreciation across a range of Asian 
countries, the form and extent of compensatory ﬁscal expansion will differ as a function of national circumstances 
and capacities. As noted in the introduction, ﬁscal loosening should be carefully considered on a case-by-case 
basis, of course, in the context of well-deﬁned expenditure programs that address priority areas, sound public 
expenditure management practices, and appropriate recognition of contingent liability and debt sustainability 
issues. Subject to these qualiﬁcations, there is a clear case for expansionary ﬁscal policy to support demand in 
the face of currency appreciation and monetary tightening.
43 Contrary to popular perception, Brazil with its large and varied manufacturing sector is not a net commodity exporter.
44 On the case for ﬁscal expansion see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005) and Prasad and Rajan (2006).19
The PRC is in a good position to adapt its policy mix in this direction. The country has a relatively low net debt, 
on the order of 15% of GDP given recent upward revisions of GDP statistics (Table 3).45 Given strong demand for 
public services in areas like health care, education, and social security, as well as demands for public goods like 
transportation infrastructure and pollution abatement, there are obvious opportunities for additional spending. 
Already as a supplement to the 11th Five Year Plan, PRC ofﬁcials have proposed a program of “Building New 
Rural Communities” designed to promote investment in rural infrastructure, including roads, water supply, gas 
distribution, and power supply. Government would provide construction materials while requiring rural residents 
to supply the labor. This program is designed to remove barriers to rural residents purchasing more consumer 
goods—the idea being that the demand for motorcycles will rise when there exist roads on which to drive them 
and that the demand for washing machines will increase when more households have running water.46  
But it is not clear how much additional public spending can be undertaken efﬁciently in the short run. Additional 
transfers to local governments to fund public services may simply be diverted into the pockets of functionaries, 
while additional spending on infrastructure and housing may mainly beneﬁt the owners of cement factories and 
construction companies. These are arguments for ramping up public spending programs slowly and for closely 
monitoring the efﬁciency of the additional spending. Spending on social insurance should be similarly constrained 
by the government’s capacity to efﬁciently administer social programs and avoid fraudulent claims.47  
In turn, these limits on the rate of growth of public spending imply a relatively limited tightening of monetary policy 
and appreciation of the currency, since doing otherwise could destabilize aggregate demand. Given the danger 
of a disorderly correction of global imbalances, this reinforces the argument for a set of carefully calibrated, 
progressive increases in spending.
At the other end of the spectrum is Japan with its high public debt and bleak demographic prospects. In the 
ﬁscal year ending March 2005, the Japanese government deﬁcit was narrowed by 0.5% of GDP to 7%. The 
authorities are understandably committed to continuing to narrow the deﬁcit, since even under a relatively 
favorable adjustment scenario the net general government debt to GDP ratio will rise signiﬁcantly from its current 
80%.48  Batini and N’Diaye (2005) forecast that even if the primary deﬁcit excluding social security is eliminated 
between now and 2010, the net-debt-to-GDP ratio will still stabilize in the neighborhood of 150% of GDP. Limited 
scope for ﬁscal support thus implies limited scope for Japan to participate in the realignment appreciation of 
Asian currencies.49  Indonesia and the Philippines fall into this category as well, given their relatively high debt 
ratios and budget deﬁcits.50
Between  these  extremes  lies  the  Republic  of  Korea,  which  is  running  a  broadly  neutral  ﬁscal  policy. The 
government continues to run modest surpluses and has resisted pressure from the IMF to adopt a supplementary 
budget; given the economy’s expansion, the resulting net ﬁscal impulse has been negative. This leaves room for 
signiﬁcant ﬁscal expansion in the event that the Korean won appreciates further on an effective basis. There would 
also appear to be room for ﬁscal expansion in Thailand, although one hesitates to give further encouragement to 
the Thai authorities’ existing tendency toward ﬁscal activism.
45 To this should be added the government’s contingent liabilities in the banking system. One might also wish to subtract central bank 
reserves as a way of moving from gross to net debt, as reserves have been used for recent bank recapitalization operations.46 
See Ma and Elledge (2005).
47 There is a role here for the ADB in identifying forms of ﬁscal spending that can be initiated and implemented quickly, upon need.
48 Note that Table 3 reports gross rather than net general government debt.
49 This does not mean that there should be no strengthening of the yen against the dollar; absent any contribution from Japan, it is hard to 
see how the trans-Paciﬁc imbalance could be corrected.  But the desirable extent of yen appreciation is probably less than the desirable 
extent of, say, renminbi appreciation for the reasons described in the text.  And the precise extent to which the yen should appreciate 
is also a function of the strength of the Japanese economy and on whether deﬂation ﬁnally gives way to inﬂation, which is yet to be 
seen.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A second set of policies said to be useful for offsetting the impact of monetary tightening seeks to foster 
the  development  of  ﬁnancial  markets.  High  household  savings  rates  in  countries  like  the  PRC  reﬂect  the 
underdevelopment of ﬁnancial markets and the difﬁculty households face in borrowing for home purchases, 
education of their children, health care for elderly family members, and putting food on the table when the 
household head is out of work. High corporate savings rates similarly reﬂect the difﬁculty enterprises face in 
obtaining external ﬁnance for capacity expansion, given the reluctance of banks to lend in the wake of the 
1997–98 crisis and the underdevelopment of markets in debt securities. Restructuring ﬁnancial institutions and 
developing ﬁnancial markets so that households can access mortgage and consumer credit and that ﬁrms with 
proﬁtable investment projects have freer access to external ﬁnance can obviate the need for such high levels of 
anticipatory saving. 
The problem is the time frame on which ﬁnancial development occurs: it is unlikely to deliver signiﬁcant results 
by the time the current constellation of global imbalances unravels. It takes time to build ﬁnancial markets and to 
construct a full-ﬂedged welfare system. Progress is measured in decades, not in months or years. The consumer-
credit crisis in the Republic of Korea—when at the beginning of the decade ﬁnancial intermediaries rushed into 
marketing credit cards and consumer lines of credit before building the requisite credit evaluation capacity—
illustrates the costs of short-circuiting this process.51 In light of this experience, and assuming the accuracy of the 
majority view that the trans-Paciﬁc imbalance does not have long to run, these structural initiatives, while helpful 
for the longer run, are unlikely to provide signiﬁcant demand support over the relevant time frame.
This perspective on the role of ﬁnancial development and integration is also quite different from the conventional 
emphasis on the desirability of deepening regional ﬁnancial markets in order to better “recycle Asian savings 
within the region.” The perspective here does not suggest that attempting to divert high Asian savings from the 
US to the region itself will have an impact on global imbalances or the risk of a disorderly correction. Asia’s 
current account surplus is the difference between the region’s savings and investment. Moving toward current 
account balance requires boosting investment and reducing savings. Financial development that enhances the 
efﬁciency of intermediation and relaxes credit constraints can facilitate adjustment by both blades of the scissors, 
but not over the time horizon relevant to the risk of a disorderly correction.
Trade liberalization
Assuming these policies are implemented and that Asian demand rotates away from exports in favor of domestic 
markets,  there  remains  the  danger  that  the  accompanying  shift  supply  could  lag.  Shifting  resources  from 
production for export to production for domestic markets entails adjustment costs for producers. Compared to 
American consumers, PRC consumers devote a larger share of their budgets to basics like food, clothing, and 
household appliances (refrigerators and stoves) and a smaller share to recreational activities, including eating 
out. Enterprises in PRC cannot shift overnight from producing textile exports to producing restaurant meals and 
from producing DVD players for export to producing refrigerators for the domestic market. It takes time to retool 
assembly lines and for workers to acquire new skills. Ideally, policies seeking to shift demand toward home goods 
should be phased in gradually in order to avoid a mismatch with the composition of supply. This is yet another 
argument for initiating these policies sooner rather than later, in this case so that producers can begin to adapt.
Another implication is that Asian countries should redouble their pursuit of trade liberalization. If governments 
liberalize both imports and exports, it will be possible for individual Asian economies to remain specialized in a 
limited, narrow range of exports in which they have a comparative advantage while at the same time increasing 
the importance of domestic demand. If the PRC continues specializing in the production and export of textiles, 
apparel, and electronics while importing a greater volume of other consumer goods from its Asian neighbors, for 
example, then it will become easier to reconcile export orientation with current account balance. 
51 By 2003, 8% the Korean population had fallen into delinquency on credit card payments, and 34% of the assets of credit card companies 
(some 3% of GNP) was impaired. LG Card, the largest issuer, had to be rescued with a $4 billion bailout from the government, which 
then set up a “bad bank” to take remaining nonperforming assets off the books of the credit card companies. See Vanderrama (2004).22
Since the current account is a macro variable—it is determined by the balance of savings and investment—trade 
liberalization is unlikely to have any particular impact on the current account balance in the long run, assuming a 
stable exchange rate or a central bank that targets inﬂation.52 What trade liberalization can do is make it easier 
for the economy to digest the impact of policies that would otherwise shift demand away from the country’s 
export industries, which would be disruptive given the time required to engineer the matching shift in supply.53
Greater exchange rate ﬂexibility 
Debate on the optimal exchange rate regime for Asian countries is ongoing: authors like McKinnon and Schnabl 
(2004) argue that relatively open, export-dependent Asian economies have good reasons to prefer pegging their 
currencies, while others like Eichengreen (2003) counter that managed ﬂexibility is no impediment to exports and 
that Asian countries will appreciate the policy autonomy conferred by greater exchange rate ﬂexibility. This long-
standing debate cannot be resolved here. The point is that in an uncertain global environment, where there is the 
possibility of a sharp shift in the level of the dollar and a signiﬁcant change in the level of global demand, Asian 
countries have special reason to value monetary autonomy. A central lesson of the literature on exit strategies 
(see, for example, Eichengreen and Masson et al., 1998) is that shifting to a regime of greater exchange rate 
ﬂexibility can disturb conﬁdence if that shift is taken under duress. It is better to move to greater ﬂexibility as a 
form of insurance before conditions grow turbulent.54 Malaysia has shown how it is possible to exit a currency 
peg without precipitating a crisis. The PRC has shown how it is possible to move in the direction of greater 
exchange rate ﬂexibility in a series of small steps while economic and ﬁnancial conditions remain favorable. The 
question remains, however, of whether it is moving fast enough.
The hard-landing scenario 
The preceding has focused on the case where Asian countries implement these policy adjustments while the 
trans-Paciﬁc imbalance persists and their efforts, together with those of the US, succeed in narrowing the gap 
smoothly and gradually.55 How should the response differ in the scenario where foreign ﬁnance for the US current 
account deﬁcit dries up abruptly, the dollar falls sharply and US demand declines dramatically before there has 
been time to put in place signiﬁcant adjustments in Asian policies?  
In this case the same overall set of policy responses is appropriate, but adjustment on each front needs to be 
more pronounced, since depreciation of the dollar and the fall in US import demand are more pronounced. 
With the dollar falling sharply, allowing Asian currencies to fall along with it would raise the danger of imported 
inﬂation. Hence the need for Asian currencies to appreciate against the dollar would be even stronger than in 
the scenario where imbalances are corrected smoothly. If Asian countries have already moved to regimes of 
greater currency ﬂexibility—if they have adopted a basket of currencies rather than the dollar as their reference 
rate and allowed their currencies to exhibit greater ﬂexibility relative to reference levels—it should be possible 
to accomplish this without disturbing conﬁdence. Similarly, with US demand growth slowing signiﬁcantly, the 
need to boost domestic demand would be even greater. There would thus be a rationale for even more ﬁscal 
stimulus.56 Finally, the urgency of trade liberalization to sustain the demand for the products of the region’s export 
industries would be greater, given the sharp decline in US demand.
52 My own analysis of the impact of trade liberalization (actually, its converse, the imposition of a tariff) on the current account in the short 
run and the long run is Eichengreen (1981).
53 For trade liberalization to help in this way, it is necessary for the entire group of Asian countries to liberalize. For more on the role of 
regional cooperation in this process, see below.
54 Note that discussions of how Asian countries should modify their policies to support smooth rebalancing of the global economy do not 
always clearly distinguish the argument for revaluation of Asian currencies (which rests on the need to permanently alter the composition 
of aggregate demand) from the argument for a more ﬂexible exchange rate regime (which rests on the need for greater policy ﬂexibility 
forwarding the future). Both are relevant in the present context, although they need to be clearly distinguished.
55 The role of the US in facilitating this adjustment is discussed below.
56 This can be seen as an argument for holding some potential ﬁscal stimulus in reserve so that it can be deployed in the event that this 
scenario in fact unfolds.23
VI.  Regional Responses
In both scenarios adjustment can be smoothed by coordinating policy initiatives within the region. I discuss this 
in the context of exchange rate adjustment, ﬁscal adjustment, trade liberalization, ﬁnancial market development, 
and reserve diversiﬁcation.
Exchange rate adjustment
Individual countries may be reluctant to allow their currencies to appreciate if this damages their competitiveness 
in other Asian markets. They may similarly fear that unilateral appreciation will damage their competitiveness in 
markets outside the region.57 These facts create a free-rider problem, where willingness to allow Asian currencies 
to appreciate may be inadequate in the absence of an agreement on concerted action.
Additionally, even those who argue that a limited increase in exchange rate ﬂexibility achieved by moving to a 
managed ﬂoat will have broadly beneﬁcial effects recognize that high levels of exchange rate volatility, which 
could result from competitive changes in exchange rates on the part of a number of countries, can be disruptive 
to trade. What matters for planning by exporters, after all, is not the dollar exchange rate but the effective 
(trade-weighted) exchange rate. In Asia, where intraregional trade is a large and growing share of total trade, 
governments can limit the volatility of effective rates by coordinating the appreciation of their currencies.
In principle, surety that Asian countries will allow their currencies to appreciate together—and therefore surety 
that they will appreciate at all—can be bolstered by the adoption of an exchange rate framework for the region: 
a common basket peg, for example, or a common basket, bank and crawl (BBC) regime.58 Verifying that Asian 
countries are complying with the terms of their agreement to cooperate would then require monitoring only 
the behavior of exchange rates themselves, as opposed to ascertaining the consistency of the entire range of 
national policies. Free riding would be easier to detect.
In practice, such an arrangement would have costs as well as beneﬁts. Asian economies differ in their dependence 
on the US market.59 It follows that a fall in US demand would have different effects on different countries and 
warrant different degrees of currency adjustment. An agreement requiring all Asian countries to adjust their 
exchange rates by the same amount against the dollar (or against a common multicurrency basket) would not 
permit these differences to be accommodated. Asian countries also differ in the scope they possess for undertaking 
compensatory ﬁscal action, as noted above; countries with little scope for doing so will understandably prefer 
to limit appreciation of their currencies.60 Again, it would not be easy to accommodate these differences in the 
presence of a regional agreement to maintain a common basket peg. 
Beyond  this,  there  is  also  the  traditional  argument  against  pegged  exchange  rates,  whether  implemented 
unilaterally or in the context of a multilateral agreement, namely that these expose Asian economies to the same 
vulnerabilities that led to the 1997–98 crisis. These arguments carry more force than otherwise when ﬁnancial 
markets may be subject to sharp shocks emanating from outside the region.
Fiscal adjustment 
Arguments can also be made for the coordination of ﬁscal policies. A complication is that the sign of the effect 
of the cross-border spillovers of expansionary ﬁscal policies are ambiguous. Some portion of the increase in 
57 Both to the US, in which case their appreciation will do little to help resolve the problem of global imbalances, and to Europe, in which 
case Asian countries that refuse to participate in the general realignment of currencies will gain export share at the expense of their 
neighbors.
58  On the BBC proposal, see Williamson (2001).
59 As noted in Section IV above.
60 Assuming, as is the case in much of the region, that the level of aggregate demand is broadly appropriate.24
domestic demand will spill out into increased import demand, which neighboring countries will experience as 
a positive externality. At the same time, an increase in deﬁcit spending will tend to drive up interest rates on 
foreign as well as domestic ﬁnancial markets, which neighboring countries will experience as a negative demand 
externality. In the Asian context it is plausible that the ﬁrst effect dominates. Intraregional trade is growing rapidly; 
hence, the import demand channel should operate relatively powerfully. On the other hand, Asian countries 
tend to be more deeply integrated with global capital markets than with each others.61 This means that an 
expansionary ﬁscal initiative by any one Asian country will have only limited interest rate effects within the region, 
since Asia as a whole and, even more so, any one Asian economy is small relative to global capital markets on 
which it borrows. 
There will thus be a tendency to underutilize ﬁscal policy in the absence of coordination. Individual economies 
will not take into account the positive impact on demand in neighboring economies when they consider ﬁscal 
expansion to counteract the effects of monetary tightening and currency appreciation. Each will rely excessively 
on its neighbors for demand stimulus in the absence of an agreement to proceed jointly.
On the framework for macroeconomic policy coordination
This raises the question of whether Asian countries have adequate institutional arrangements in place for 
coordinating monetary and ﬁscal adjustments.  ASEAN+3 already possess a variety of mechanisms for consultation, 
information sharing, and ﬁnancial assistance. Since 2000 they have negotiated a network of regional swap lines 
and credits, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), to provide external assistance to countries whose ﬁnancial markets 
and exchange rates are perturbed. At the time of writing some $40 billion of bilateral swaps have been arranged 
under the CMI aegis. While this arrangement has yet to be activated, its existence will be comforting to countries 
contemplating an increase in exchange rate ﬂexibility but concerned that their more ﬂexible rates may exhibit 
undue volatility.
In addition, Asian governments have put in place surveillance mechanisms for pooling information and encouraging 
concerted action. The Asian Surveillance Process (ASP) agreed to at the second ASEAN ﬁnance ministers 
meeting in Jakarta in February 1998 became operational in early 1999. A unit within the ASEAN Secretariat, the 
ASEAN Surveillance Coordinating Unit, has been established to coordinate the work of the ASP and provide 
semiannual surveillance reports with technical support from the ADB. Peer reviews based on these reports are 
undertaken at meetings of the ASEAN ﬁnance ministers every six months. These regular meetings should make 
it easier for policy makers to recognize the argument for coordinated policy initiatives.
Unfortunately, the three big Asian economies—PRC, Japan, and Republic of Korea—do not participate in the ASP. 
Recognition of this led in the late 1990s to the formation of an ASEAN+3 Study Group to explore arrangements 
for information exchange and policy dialogue. Its efforts culminated in establishment of the ASEAN+3 Economic 
Review and Policy Dialogue Process (ERPDP). Formed in 1999, the ERPDP provides an umbrella for annual 
meetings of ﬁnance ministers and semiannual meetings of deputies. More recently, ADB has created an Ofﬁce 
of Regional Economic Integration (OREI) to provide technical assistance for this process. Information sharing 
through ASEAN+3 should make it easier to verify that countries are adhering to their commitment to sharing the 
burden of adjustment and thereby reduce scope for free riding. 
The Asian way is to avoid overt criticism of anothers’ policies (Manzano 2001). Some would say that policy 
coordination cannot succeed because Asian norms preclude overt criticism of one’s neighbors and thus are 
not conducive to credible regional commitments. It is particularly unclear whether a low-key approach will be 
consistent with effective coordination when dramatic changes in policies in a large number of Asian countries are 
needed in short order. 
The problem of global imbalances thus points up the urgency of measures to more effectively coordinate exchange 
rate, monetary, and ﬁscal policies, and in particular to enhance the frankness of regional surveillance. One way 
of doing so would be to create an autonomous ASEAN+3 surveillance unit independent of governments—one 
61 For evidence see Eichengreen and Luegnarimitchai (2004), McCauley and Park (2004) and Eichengreen and Park (2005).25
that had secure long-term funding, whose head and key staff had job security, and that was required by statute 
to publish its reports. Obviously this would be a radical departure from Asia’s relatively permissive approach to 
surveillance.
Trade liberalization 
For many years Asian countries signed fewer regional and bilateral agreements than western countries, preferring 
to pursue multilateral liberalization. This may be changing, however. ASEAN continues to make progress in 
constructing its free trade area, currently scheduled for completion by 2010.62 It has concluded a framework 
agreement with the PRC on trade in goods; negotiations on trade in services and investment rules are ongoing. 
At the time of writing it is pursuing a trade-in-goods agreement with the Republic of Korea and FTAs with Hong 
Kong, China and New Zealand. The negotiation of bilateral agreements between ASEAN and India and Japan 
is proceeding more slowly. On an alternative track, Japan is pursuing bilateral agreements with a number of 
individual Asian countries (Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand). Given the desirability of bolstering intraregional 
trade, a more comprehensive approach would be desirable. To put it another way, if Asian countries are going to 
export less to the US, it becomes all the more important that they be able to export freely to one another.
Financial development
Cooperation in fostering the development of ﬁnancial markets occurs in the context of the Asian Bond Fund 
(ABF) and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI). Having surveyed these policies in an earlier background 
paper for ADB (Eichengreen 2005b), my discussion here will focus on the relevance of these initiatives to the 
orderly resolution of the global-imbalances problem.
The AMBI, endorsed by ASEAN+3 ﬁnance ministers at their meeting in Manila in August 2003, is designed to 
foster an active and liquid secondary market in local-currency bonds and to develop the infrastructure needed for 
the growth of local bond markets. Six aspects of that infrastructure have been identiﬁed for further consideration: 
(i) the provision of credit guarantees; (ii) the provision of credit ratings to a wider range of potential issuers; (iii) the 
creation of mechanisms for more efﬁciently disseminating information on issuers and rating agency decisions; 
(iv) the  establishment  of  more  efﬁcient  mechanisms  for  cross-border  settlement  and  currency  conversion; 
(v) encouraging the participating countries to share information on initiatives to develop the human resources 
and policies needed for the growth of local ﬁnancial markets; and (vi) strengthening the legal framework for 
bond market development. Governments have sought to prioritize by establishing working groups and creating 
a focal group to coordinate their activities. The working groups are concerned with the creation of securitized 
debt instruments, the creation of credit guarantee mechanisms, foreign exchange and settlement issues, the 
issuance of bonds denominated in local currencies by nonresidents (multilateral development banks, foreign 
government agencies, and multinational corporations), rating agencies and information dissemination, and the 
coordination of technical assistance. Results include the issuance of local currency bonds by ADB in a number of 
Asian countries in the effort to enhance the liquidity of local markets; agreement on the desirability of exempting 
nonresidents from domestic withholding taxes; and the provision of credit guarantees by the Japanese Bank 
for International Cooperation and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance for bonds issued by select Asian 
multinational corporations.
The ABF launched by the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Paciﬁc Central Banks (EMEAP) in June 2003 is 
designed to catalyze the growth of Asian bond markets by allocating a portion of the reserves of regional central 
banks to purchases of government and quasi-government securities. The initial $1 billion of investments, known 
as ABF-I, was devoted exclusively to Asian sovereign and quasi-sovereign issues of dollar-denominated bonds. 
ABF-II is twice as large and includes bonds denominated in regional currencies. It has two components: a 
$1 billion central bank reserve pool to be overseen by professional managers for local bond allocation, and a 
$1 billion index unit designed to list on eight stock exchanges beginning with Hong Kong, China in 2005. The 
latter is designed to facilitate one-stop entry for retail and institutional buyers as well as providing a benchmark 
structure for tracking pan-Asian performance. 
62 2015 in the case of full compliance on the part of the four newest ASEAN members.26
The question is whether one-stop entry and a benchmark structure will attract private participation in the absence 
of an increase in underlying liquidity. Turnover rates are stagnant in most Asian markets, with those for corporate 
bonds only a fraction of turnover in government bonds.63  More positively, the Republic of Korea and Malaysian 
governments have succeeded in placing longer-dated securities as a way of extending their benchmark yield 
curves. According to ADB, the stock of Asian local currency bonds rose by 6%, to $1.5 trillion, in the ﬁrst half of 
2005. This additional issuance was dominated by bond issues by ﬁnancial institutions in the PRC and Republic 
of Korea and corporate issuance in Hong Kong, China (the latter reﬂecting in part ﬁnancing investments in the 
PRC). While government issuance of local currency bonds declined in the year ending June 2005, corporate 
issuance rose slightly, which is promising from the standpoint of market development.
From the perspective of global imbalances, the question is when these initiatives will inﬂuence saving and 
investment behavior. The growth of corporate issuance bodes well for the moderation of corporate savings 
rates; if enterprises are able to borrow on local bond markets, they will become less reliant on retained earnings. 
With the expansion of private-sector issuance, it will become more economical for originators to securitize loans 
to small and medium-sized enterprises, consumer credit and mortgage credit, enhancing the ﬁnancial market 
access of households and reducing the need for high levels of household savings rates. Over a ﬁve-to-ten year 
interval, signiﬁcant progress may be possible on these fronts. At the time of writing, however, there is as yet little 
sign that these developments have signiﬁcantly altered household or corporate behavior.
Reserve diversiﬁcation
A ﬁnal context for policy coordination is reserve diversiﬁcation. As has been noted, Asian countries seeking to 
diversify out of dollars (or even to curtail the further accumulation of dollar-denominated debt securities) face a 
collective-action problem.64 From the standpoint of an individual central bank, selling dollars for euros, sterling, 
Swiss francs, or other reserve currencies will apply only limited pressure for the greenback to depreciate against 
regional currencies.65  But if Asian central banks as a group sell dollars for other reserve currencies, there will be 
strong pressure for the dollar to fall. This creates a familiar prisoner’s dilemma. Central banks as a group may 
wish to prevent the dollar from falling sharply, insofar as they seek to support and maintain the national model of 
export-led growth; they may thus wish to limit their collective diversiﬁcation out of dollars. At the same time, each 
central bank has an incentive to undertake sales of dollars if it thinks that other central banks will be tempted to 
do so. A rumor to the effect that other central banks are selling dollars may ignite a generalized scramble into 
other currencies in order to avoid taking losses as a result of being late, precipitating the very dollar collapse that 
central banks seek to avoid.
In principle, this suggests the desirability of an international agreement on the pace of reserve diversiﬁcation. 
Truman (2005b) proposes that countries negotiate an international reserve standard—that reserve managers 
could agree to aim for portfolios that were composed of, say, one third dollars, one third euros, and one third 
yen.66 There would then be a schedule for moving gradually from present portfolios to portfolios consistent with 
the standard.67  
But it is hard to believe that, in practice, central banks would agree to tie their hands in this way. Like other 
investors, central bankers value their autonomy to make investment decisions. It seems unlikely that they would 
allow their portfolio allocation decisions to be dictated by an international agreement.
63 Data on annualized bond market turnover are from asianbondsonline.adb.org .
64 The ﬁrst statement to this effect may have been Eichengreen (2004).
65 Moreover, to the extent that other Asian central banks remain committed to preventing the dollar from depreciating against their 
currencies, they will have an incentive to purchase the dollars than the renegade central bank is selling—which will only work to 
increase the incentive to defect from the implicit agreement to provide collective support.
66 Countries could then be permitted leeway in the form of a 10 percentage point band around the norm for each currency share (43% to 
23%).
67 In addition, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan, which sold the euros and yen that other central banks sought to add to 
their portfolios would commit to feeding the additional dollars they acquired in return to the market at a measured pace.27
A more realistic way of reducing the incentive to chisel on a collective commitment to limit reserve diversiﬁcation 
might be for central banks to simply agree to provide more information on the composition of their reserves. If 
they commit to publishing more information on their reserve transactions, it will become correspondingly more 
difﬁcult for central banks to diversify out of dollars without being noticed, and the incentive to renege on an 
implicit agreement to cooperate will be correspondingly less. 
Truman has in fact suggested how this might be done. Countries would agree on a supplement to the reserve 
template of the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), committing themselves to provide information 
on the currency composition of their on- and off-balance-sheet foreign currency positions on a quarterly basis 
with at most a one-month lag. Already upwards of 20 economies subscribing to the SDDS voluntarily provide 
data, typically annually, on the composition of their reserves. At the time of writing, however, the only Asian 
economies that have committed to doing so are Hong Kong, China and the Philippines. If Asian central banks 
are going to rely on increased transparency to foster collective action in this sphere, a larger number will have 
to follow this path-breaking pair.
VII.   Global Responses 
We have argued that it is in Asia’s own interest to begin now implementing policy measures to facilitate the 
orderly correction of the trans-Paciﬁc imbalance—effectively, to buy insurance against the risk of a disorderly 
adjustment. Those policy adjustments will be more comfortable and more effective if they are coordinated within 
the region. But they will be even more appetizing if the US agrees to share the adjustment burden. 
Standard macroeconomic models where increased public saving lead to increased national saving suggest 
that the trans-Paciﬁc savings-investment imbalance can be ameliorated by both increases in deﬁcit spending in 
Asia and reductions in deﬁcit spending in America. If changes in policy have convex costs (that increase with 
the magnitude of the adjustment), then governments are more likely to accomplish the optimal adjustment with 
contributions from both sides of the Paciﬁc—with currency appreciation and ﬁscal expansion in Asia together 
with currency depreciation and ﬁscal consolidation in the US.
Cline (2005) argues on this basis for a new Plaza Agreement. His Plaza II would involve intervention by G-20 
central banks to drive the dollar down against other currencies. The IMF would provide an estimate of equilibrium 
rates for three tiers of countries: those whose currencies should rise by 40% or more against the dollar over 
3 years, those whose currencies should rise by 15–40%, and those for which there would be no speciﬁc initiative 
unless the currency began falling against the dollar. There would be 13 economies in the ﬁrst tier, including 
PRC; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand. Six 
countries would be in the second tier, including the Republic of Korea and India.68 As its contribution, the US 
would set forth credible plans for eliminating its ﬁscal deﬁcit over 5 years. As the author puts it, “a US commitment 
to eliminate its ﬁscal deﬁcit would counter other countries’ otherwise understandable reaction against being 
asked to take action to solve a problem rooted in ﬂawed US economic policies.” 69
Coordinated policy adjustments are difﬁcult to arrange. Negotiating a Plaza II Agreement would be even more 
difﬁcult than negotiating the original Plaza Agreement because more countries and economies would be involved; 
today an effective agreement would have to involve the G-20 countries rather than just the G-7. As described in 
Section II, there exist a number of alternative interpretations of the US current account deﬁcit, not all of which 
have the same welfare and policy implications. Theoretical and empirical work alike points to the difﬁculty of 
agreeing on mutually-beneﬁcial coordinated adjustments in national policies in the absence of agreement on the 
conceptual model.70   
68 Effective appreciation would be considerably smaller than 15% or 40%, as the economies in question trade heavily with one another 
and would be moving together.
69 Cline (2005), p.7.
70 See Frankel and Rockett (1988) and Eichengreen and Uzan (1993).28
More fundamentally, there is reluctance in the US to acknowledge what Cline politely refers to as ﬂaws in US 
policy. The prospects for adjustments in US policy are the subject of another paper. Sufﬁce it to say that there is 
no consensus among policy makers in the US about how to address the ﬁscal situation, or even that the ﬁscal 
situation constitutes a problem. To make a difference, the Congress, the Treasury, and the President would have 
to reach an agreement on this issue. Asian governments, ASEAN+3, and the IMF can make the case, but doing 
so will be to no avail so long as the US refuses to hear.
VIII.  Conclusion
Policies toward the trans-Paciﬁc imbalance are not easy to recommend because there is little agreement on 
the causes of the phenomenon and therefore no consensus regarding its consequences. One school regards 
the imbalance as benign. Others, in contrast, see it as a source of serious danger. One way of formulating 
recommendations for policy despite the absence of agreement is to think in terms of the risk-management 
approach to policy articulated by Greenspan (2004). This approach takes risk as the deﬁning feature of the global 
policy environment and urges that policy be adapted accordingly. Although it may not be possible to attach a 
precise point estimate to the risk of a disorderly correction of the US current account, this does not relieve policy 
makers of the need to adapt their strategies to the possibility. 
In the present context, this means tightening monetary policy and allowing Asian currencies to appreciate relative 
to current levels as a way of achieving a better balance between internal and external demand, thereby reducing 
the Asian economies’ dependence on a source of export demand that could collapse abruptly. Leaving the overall 
level of demand unchanged requires that this monetary tightening be complemented by some relaxation of ﬁscal 
policy. Of course, the ﬁscal context differs across economies, and the scope for expansionary policy should be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Precisely because the scope for ﬁscal support of domestic demand differs, 
so too does the optimal degree of monetary tightening and exchange rate adjustment required. This observation 
makes clear that an attempt to suppress intra-Asian exchange rate movements would be counterproductive in 
this context; it would be a recipe for no action to minimize the risk of a disorderly correction.
Other policy measures that produce effects over longer horizons can further contribute to the rotation of demand 
away from exports to the US in favor of regional sources. These include the development of Asian ﬁnancial 
markets and the completion of an Asian free trade area. These initiatives will be most beneﬁcial if implementation 
begins now, in the case of monetary and ﬁscal policies because they are most easily absorbed in small doses, 
and in the case of structural measures because time is required for their effects to be felt.
These policy adjustments will go down most easily if they are coordinated within Asia.71 The US current account 
deﬁcit has as its counterpart current account surpluses in a number of different Asian countries.72 Painful steps to 
limit the risks associated with this imbalance are less attractive to individual countries if the burden is not shared 
by others. In the absence of agreement to cooperate, this means that policy adjustments taken in the name of 
risk management will be undersupplied. This creates well-known arguments for collective policy adjustments. 
It points to the need for discussions of exchange rate and budgetary adjustments, so as to internalize the 
intraregional spillovers associated with monetary and ﬁscal action.73 It points to the importance of stronger and 
more independent regional economic surveillance to facilitate the collective assessment of economic conditions 
and vulnerabilities and to facilitate collective action. More speciﬁcally, it also points to the need for agreement 
on rules for reserve composition disclosure to facilitate the coordination of reserve diversiﬁcation and avoid 
destabilizing policy shifts.
The obstacles in the way of collective policy adjustments are well known. Still, the fact that the task is hard and 
success is uncertain is no justiﬁcation for inaction. 
71 And across the Paciﬁc, although realism requires acknowledging that the prospects for this are dim.
72 And, to a lesser extent, non-Asian countries.
73 The fact that exchange rates within the region should continue to vary, as emphasized in the preceding paragraph, does nothing to 
undermine this argument for coordination.29
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